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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 06-2669
                    
XIONG DONG,
                                      Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                         Respondent
                    
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF 
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Agency No. A77-994-001
Immigration Judge: Henry S. Dogin
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 27, 2007
                    
Before: BARRY, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 11, 2007)
                    
OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Petitioner Xiong Dong, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, petitions for
review of a December 19, 2003 order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
2affirming an October 15, 2002 decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his claim
for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) and ordering his removal. 
Because petitioner has failed to prove that it is more likely than not that he will be
tortured if returned to China, we will deny the petition.  
Petitioner arrived at Los Angeles International Airport from China without a valid
entry document on October 28, 2001.  He was detained by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”) and served with a Notice to Appear that charged him with
failing to produce a valid entry document in violation of section 212(a)(7)(A)(I)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationalization Act (“INA”).  In an interview with an INS agent,
petitioner first claimed that he came to the United States because he was not allowed to
practice Catholicism in China, citing one incident in which he helped a priest escape
when Chinese police disrupted prayers which the priest and others, including petitioner,
were saying.  When asked the priest’s name, he said he did not know, and then admitted
that the story was a lie and that he had come to the United States “for a better future.” 
(A.R. 204.)  Conceding his removability, petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) on the basis of
religion, political opinion, and membership in a particular social group. 
The IJ conducted a hearing on October 15, 2002.  Petitioner testified that Chinese
government officials had persecuted him because of his practice of Catholicism, and he
feared that if returned to China he would be forced to endure further persecution on the
same basis.  On cross-examination, the government asked petitioner specific questions
3about being a practicing Catholic in China.  Some of his answers were unresponsive and
others seemingly contradicted statements he had made in his asylum application; indeed,
as the IJ subsequently observed in his oral decision, petitioner “had no idea what the
Catholic church was all about.”  (A.R. 23.)  After conferring with his counsel, petitioner
withdrew his claims for asylum and withholding of removal, and proceeded solely on his
claim for relief under CAT.  
Petitioner testified in support of his CAT claim that because he had been smuggled
out of China, it was “possible” that if returned he would be “hit” and sent to jail.  (A.R.
107-09.)  When asked by the government why he really had come to the United States,
though, he responded, “to attend school.”  (A.R. 108.)  The IJ then concluded the hearing,
and, in his oral decision, denied petitioner relief and ordered his removal.  On appeal, the
BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion.  
We have subject-matter jurisdiction over final orders of removal pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Where, as here, the BIA affirms the decision of the IJ without an
additional opinion, we review the IJ’s opinion, “scrutiniz[ing] its reasoning.”  Dia v.
Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  Our review is de novo, affording
legal determinations deference under Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004).  We
also defer to factual findings, and only reject them if “‘a[] reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”  Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
Finally, if the record contains “substantial evidence” supporting the denial of a claim
4seeking relief under CAT, we must affirm.  Id. at 350.  
A petitioner seeking relief under CAT “bears the burden of establishing ‘that it is
more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country
of removal.’”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(c)(2)).  Federal regulations define “torture” as 
acts done “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity,” by means of
which “severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted” for purposes such as obtaining confessions,
punishment, intimidation or coercion.  
Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)).  
Applying these standards, the IJ concluded that petitioner had failed to carry his
burden under CAT.  As noted above, petitioner claimed that because he had been
smuggled out of China, the Chinese government would possibly hit and imprison him
upon his return.  The IJ correctly held that these claims of possible imprisonment and
physical abuse did not demonstrate that it was more likely than not that petitioner would
be tortured if returned to China.  The IJ conceded that it was possible that petitioner might
“have a problem on returning,” and “that the Chinese government may actually stop him
and may actually question him, may actually take him into custody,” but that these
measures do not constitute torture.  (J.A. 24.)  We have previously denied a petitioner’s
claim of relief under CAT where the petitioner claimed in a similarly conclusory fashion
that, if returned to China, she would be prosecuted and imprisoned on the basis of her
previous illegal exit.  Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  In that case,
5like this one, the petitioner failed to establish that she would be singled out for
particularly harsh punishment or that the alleged punishment would be so severe as to
amount to torture.  Id.  
Because the record contains substantial evidence supporting the denial of
petitioner’s CAT claim, we will deny the petition for review. 
